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The procedures for Voting in the Council of the European Union are described in the treaties of the EU. The Council of the European Union was instituted under this name in the Maastricht Treaty. The voting procedures defined there were changed in subsequent treaties (Treaty of Amsterdam, Treaty of Nice and the treaties of accession) to accommodate the growing number of member states in the EU and are currently based on the Treaty of Nice. They are supposed to be superseded by the Treaty of Lisbon.
Voting procedures for decisions not requiring unanimityHere is an overview of the formerly used, currently used and proposed voting systems employed in the Council of the European Union. The following only applies to certain legislation while others require unanimity among all Council members. When the Council is not acting on a proposal of the Commission, a higher threshold is used to pass legislation. Treaty of Maastricht (1993-1999)Treaty of Amsterdam (1999-2003)Treaty of Nice (current)
This is the currently applicable voting system. According to the procedure, each member state has a fixed number of votes. The number allocated to each country is roughly determined by its population (see table on the right), but progressively weighted in favor of smaller countries. To pass a vote, both of the following conditions must apply to establish qualified majority voting (QMV) – the bloc's key way of decision-making in the absence of a consensus:
Furthermore, a member may1 request the verification of the population condition (which is then also required for the resolution to be adopted):
The population requirement is almost always already implied by the condition on the number of votes. The rare exceptions to this may occur in certain cases when a proposal is backed by exactly three of the six most populous member states but not including Germany, that is, three of France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland, and by all or nearly all of the 21 other members. Furthermore, when the European Council is not acting on a proposal of the Commission, the qualified majority requires backing by two thirds (rather than a simple majority) of the member states.2 Note that mechanisms by which the Commission makes a proposal may not require weighted votes. For example, the Anti-Dumping Advisory Committee (ADAC) can approve a proposal to impose tariffs based on a simple, unweighted majority. Since this simple majority vote leads to a Commission proposal to the Council, the simple majority effectively requires a qualified majority to overturn it (because overturning the recommendation of the ADAC means voting against a Commission proposal). This greatly increases the power of small member states in such circumstances. The declarations of the conference which adopted the treaty of Nice contained contradictory statements concerning qualified majority voting (QMV) after the enlargement of the European Union to 25 and 27 members: one declaration3 specified that the qualifying majority of votes would increase to a maximum of 73.4%, contradicting another declaration4 which specified a qualifying majority of 258 votes (74.78%) after enlargement to 27 countries. But the treaties of accession following the Treaty of Nice clarified the actual required majority. Treaty of Lisbon (proposed)
The Constitution envisaged the "double majority" system for the QMV which according to some countries better reflects the true size of populations and at the same time acknowledges the smaller member states' fears of being overruled by the larger countries. The Treaty of Lisbon has adopted this method. The second condition of at least 4 countries against the proposal is to ensure that the most populous Member States cannot block decisions and is important in 10 different voting scenarios where legislation requiring QMV can be passed although the population requirement isn't fulfilled and all member states except: Germany and France and one of UK, Italy, Spain or Poland are for the proposal. In practice one has to take into account the political likelihood for each minority. Penrose method (proposed)
Poland proposed the Penrose method (colloquially called the "square root" system) which would narrow the weighting of votes between the largest and smallest countries in terms of population. The Czech Republic supported this method to an extent, but has warned it would not back a Polish veto on this matter. All the other states remained opposed.5 After previously refusing to discuss the issue, the German government agreed to include it for discussion at the June council.6 The given percentage is the game theoretical optimal threshold 7, and is known as the "Jagiellonian Compromise" 8. Future provisionsOne of the key sticking points before the European Council meeting in June 2007 was Poland's demand for a change in the proposed voting system in the Council of the European Union. After hard negotiations the European Summit eventually agreed on a compromise in the early morning of June 23, 2007. According to the compromise, the current Nice treaty voting rules remain in place until 2014. Between 2014 and 2017 a transitional phase is to take place where the new qualified majority voting rules apply (see above), but where the old Nice treaty voting weights can be applied when a member state wishes so. Also from 2014 a new version of the 1994 "Ioannina Compromise" will take effect, which allows small minorities of EU states to call for re-examination of EU decisions they do not like.9 Decisions requiring unanimityAt present, QMV is used to pass certain legislation while others require unanimity among all Council members. Under the proposed Treaty of Lisbon, which has to be ratified by all member states before it can enter into force, decisions in 54 10 more policy areas would be taken using QMV, leaving only key, sensitive issues to be decided unanimously (including tax, social policy, defence, foreign policy and treaty revision). Supporters argue this change will be necessary in order to streamline decision-making and prevent gridlock in a newly enlarged European Union. Others see the change as a loss of sovereignty from individual member states, as it effectively abolishes the national veto in many areas. See also
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